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CULTURAL VALUES AND GOVERNMENT
Walter E. Dellinger III∗
In January 1996, the Ninth Circuit decided Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts.1 I was acting Solicitor General at the time, and the issue
came quickly to my desk, along with a visit from the Director of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the excellent actress Jane Alexander.
The case involved the constitutionality of the Helms Amendment, which
required that the NEA take decency into account in choosing who should be
awarded artistic grants.2 Karen Finley was one of those whose expected
grant did not get renewed after the decency criteria had been invoked.
The Ninth Circuit decision ruling against the NEA was, as you might
imagine, welcomed with great enthusiasm by the NEA. They did not care
for the Helms Amendment, and when the director came to me, she said
happily, “We have this wonderful loss in the Ninth Circuit, and as your client, we’ll be happy for this matter to end there. There will be no need to
seek review in the Supreme Court.” My response was that she and I were
both employees or officers of the United States; that my client was the
United States; the Congress spoke for the United States; and that we had an
obligation to defend acts of Congress if they were defensible grounds for
doing so. There were defensible grounds indeed, almost certain to prevail—and indeed, correctly so, in my view.
To the question whether this is governmental censorship and offense to
the First Amendment, my response was it may well be, but that the problem
is that, if the Helms Amendment is an unconstitutional imposition of government values, then so is the NEA itself. What they do all day long, every
day, is censor. And if government cannot take values into account in making awards, then we have got a much bigger problem for the Endowment
than the Helms Amendment. But what we cannot do is say that because we
prefer Karen Finley’s art to Norman Rockwell’s art, Congress cannot have
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the reverse presumption and say we like Norman Rockwell better than
Karen Finley.
Now, I raise this case because it brought into sharp focus the fact that
we all want government to impose cultural values as long as they are our
values. In fact, one of the moves we all are tempted to make is to define
our cultural values as something other than cultural values, which is what
immediately transpires in this kind of discussion. The Director of the NEA,
like most people in that community, would say, of course, “That is a mistake. The Helms Amendment imposes cultural values imposed by the government; our people judge on artistic merit, and that is a different category.”
To which my response was, “Look, I may agree with your notion of artistic
merit.” In Karen Finley’s act, she smears her body with chocolate and
gives a paean to feminism. “But I cannot believe that if you have some
equally effective actor who smeared his or her body with chocolate and
made an impassioned cry to index capital gains for inflation that they would
have gotten the award. It cannot be. You do not make these awards on
weakness of application.”
So, I came away from that experience with the thought that I actually
find it quite troublesome that the government funds the arts at all; that while
the Helms Amendment could well be problematic, so is the funding. I find
myself dismaying my friends who, like I, enjoy government-funded art,
wondering about National Public Radio and National Public Television. I
do not see how we get out of this box. The one thing I knew was that we
could not say, “It is okay to prefer Karen Finley to Norman Rockwell, but
not vice versa,” however artistically merited that position might be. We all
are drawn by this tension. I come at it, I think, from the Cato Institute perspective. Roger Pilon would say that I am a soft Catoite, a squishy Catoite,
who still thinks Lochner3 was wrongly decided, in spite of his pounding.
But I want to raise it in the context that I think is quite salient; that is, the
role of government in shaping religious values and opinions of the population.
Since we do not really know what the new Chief Justice or Justice
Alito’s views will be, I believe eight of the nine Justices on the previous
Court got this wrong on one principle or another. In other words, that we
have a group of Justices who are comfortable with having the government
impose its religious values directly by having government views of religion,
government endorsement, and government promotion. And there are four
other Justices—Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and often Breyer—who would
have the government take cognizance of religion in a negative way, denying
the use of funding by religious groups or individuals—when government
funding is itself neutral. Anybody may use an interpreter for the deaf to go
to school; anybody may use the school premises, first come first serve; anyone may have a student club. All of these are areas where there is govern3
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ment funding. And those who would exclude—including vouchers—
religious people from being able to participate also miss the notion that
what ought to be controlling is the critical right of private choice.
There ought to be private choice about religion, and I believe that only
Justice O’Connor, who has been underappreciated in this area, got it consistently right. By the magic of five to four, the Court, I think, got every religious decision right for almost the entire time of the Rehnquist Court,
because of her consistent voting on a very simple principle: government religion, bad; private religion, good.4 Her view of religion was robust private
choice. That is to say, where government provided resources for citizens to
decide how to use those resources, you were free to make an intervening
private religious choice: robust private choice with government itself having no role. Only she got it right in terms of shaping the religious culture.
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(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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